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as the linotype machine   and began following the lead of their American counter-
parts  such as Jacob Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst  by de-emphasizing
serious political discourse. Instead, to achieve mass appeal, newspapers adopted
lurid headlines and grisly crime stories, simplified their texts and provided more pic-
tures, and included new sections such as the entertainment page and comic strips.
Also, with rising costs, press ownership increasingly fell into the hands of those
from the business, industrial, and financial worlds. While these new owners usually
found it unnecessary to seek funds from political parties (and thus helped encourage
the rise of a less openly partisan press), newspapers grew ever more obsessed with
attracting readers and advertisers. By the turn of the century, it was not unusual to
find promotional contests eclipsing serious news. Moreover, the new corporate
newspaper engaged in buyouts and predatory pricing to drive out competition, not
only within the city in which it published, but also in surrounding locales, thus leav-
ing several medium-sized communities with a single tract. As well, the range of
opinion within newspapers narrowed. For example, publishers who were increas-
ingly part of the political or business elite, while sometimes criticizing monopoliza-
tion in particular sectors, never sanctioned sources questioning the basic supremacy
of capitalism as a socio-economic system. Some publishers even used their newspa-
pers to promote their run for political office or the enterprises in which they had
investments.
Although this study would have benefited from further analysis of the French-
Canadian press  to consider, for example, whether the influence of Catholicism or
nationalisme affected the process and effects of consolidation  From Politics to
Profit nevertheless remains a well-researched and strongly argued book that con-
veys its thesis concisely without ever oversimplifying. Sotiron does a good job of
integrating pertinent theories from communication and business history and clearly
identifies the relevant wider social and economic trends. In explaining why newspa-
pers provided a rather restricted scope of opinion at a time when they had the means
to convey to so many people so much information, this book effectively demon-
strates the danger of press concentration. Sotirons work deserves a wide audience,
not just for the value of the information it provides about the past, but also for the
continuing pertinence of its message for the present.
Jeff Keshen
University of Ottawa
Claude Beauregard  Guerre et censure au Canada, 1939–1945, Sillery (Québec),
Septentrion, 1998, 196 p.
At the outset of the Second World War, Ottawa picked up censorship, with its other
wartime policies, more or less where it had been dropped a generation earlier in
1918. A small corps of 16 censors began intercepting international telegrams and
telephone calls, reading other peoples mail, and instructing editors and news direc-
tors on what might give aid or comfort to the enemy. By the wars end, postal cen-
Comptes rendus / Book Reviews 127
sorship alone employed 721 people with a command of 47 different languages.
Military secrets ranged from weather forecasts to the armour on the wholly inade-
quate Valentine tanks manufactured in Montreal for the Russians. Censors also
hunted for communications that might undermine civil or military morale.
Penalties were real. Grumbling about being sent back to assault the Gothic Line
after only three days rest cost a soldier his next 90 days pay. The temptation to sup-
press anything that shocked or alarmed a censor was powerful and not always
resisted. A British correspondent in Halifax who worried about Canadas rapid
Americanization faced an unpleasant interview with the RCMP. A pamphlet pur-
portedly expressing André Laurendeaus case for Quebec separatism did not get as
far as France.
An historian at the Department of National Defence and a former army officer,
Claude Beauregard accepts that soldiers surrender some of their rights when they
join up. Even war correspondents could function with armies in the field if they
accepted and even embraced their role as propagandists and cheerleaders. Anyone
who recalls last springs reportage from the Kosovo campaign will not be astonished.
Some readers may be more surprised at the extent of wartime censorship. In addi-
tion to the letters and messages of a million members of the armed forces, censors
routinely read private correspondence of anyone living in the Atlantic provinces and
British Columbia. Others pored through letters and messages to and from thousands
of designated businesses, associations, and individuals elsewhere in Canada judged
to be worth the trouble. According to figures released only in 1984, wartime censors
checked out 45,419,358 letters and parcels and intercepted over 134 million cables
and telegrams.
Was there a military benefit? Did loose lips sink any ships? Beauregard does not
ask. Perhaps there is no answer. Indeed, the major purpose of censorship shifted
from denying information to the enemy to providing it to the Canadian government.
Centuries before George Gallup, secret police had been eavesdropping and opening
mail to provide their employers with timely opinion research. Canadas wartime
censors were soon busy doing as much for the King government and, when asked,
for their British and American allies.
Were there outraged protests from editors and opposition politicians? Beauregard
detected very little. In 1943 an outraged censor, W. J. Edmunston Scott, actually
went public over a request  apparently from the British  to monitor the postwar
plans of womens organizations. Far from denouncing the government, the Globe
and Mail criticized the Tory opposition, while the devoutly Liberal Winnipeg Free
Press accused censors of overstepping their bounds. By taking opposition party
leaders slightly into his confidence, King secured their quiescence on this and other
occasions. Conceivably, King himself was unaware of the censors informative role.
The age of opinion polling had reached Ottawa almost simultaneously, and the num-
bers it produced were as beguiling as mimeographed reports from Rimouski or
Canso.
Compared to individual citizens, Beauregard insists, major newspapers were rela-
tively immune from wartime censorship. The new chief censors, Wilfred Eggleton
and Fulgence Charpentier, were wiser journalists than their 19141918 predecessor,
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Colonel Ernest J. Chambers, and, on the whole, they worked with shrewder politi-
cians. Like Chambers, the chief censors tried, with considerable success, to make
editors and news directors into allies. Nor were government ministers always sub-
missive. Munitions Minister C. D. Howe was determined to publicize Canadas war-
time productivity, whatever benefit it might bring to Axis agents, and wartime
Canada remained enough of a democracy either to muzzle prominent politicians or
to encourage them to tangle with prominent newspaper proprietors.
Montreals nationalist organ, Le Devoir, was a conspicuous beneficiary. Under the
management of Georges Pelletier, the paper was as careful as its competitors to
avoid breaching military secrecy, but its conspicuous refusal to promote Canadas
warlike spirit drove censors wild. Faced with repeated requests to impose the full
rigour of the law, King and his Quebec ministers refused to make a martyr. In con-
trast, it was government ministers who demanded suppression of news when NRMA
men mutinied in Terrace, B.C., in 1944, while the censors urged realism. The news
would inevitably get out.
By turning his doctoral thesis into a readable book, Claude Beauregard and his
publisher have made a useful contribution to an understanding of Canada in the
throes of total war. Long after the war, some may expect more indignation, but
Beauregard remembers that there was a war on. Shock that Ottawa collected half a
million files on its 11 million subjects will mingle with regret that, by the end of
August 1945, they were ashes. What could social historians have learned!
Desmond Morton
McGill University
Éric Bédard  Chronique d’une insurrection appréhendée : la crise d’Octobre et le
milieu universitaire, Sillery (Québec), Septentrion, 1998, 199 p.
Dans cette étude, tirée dun mémoire de maîtrise, lauteur tente de répondre à une
question très précise à savoir « était-il raisonnable de penser », comme lon fait plu-
sieurs politiciens à lépoque, « que les activités felquistes de lautomne 1970 pou-
vaient entraîner un soulèvement étudiant de grande envergure? » (p. 183). Il aborde
là un sujet inédit dans lhistoriographie québécoise. En effet, si les politiciens, les
forces policières et les témoins de lépoque ont émit leurs points de vue à ce sujet,
les chercheurs, pour leur part, ne sétaient pas encore penchés sur la question. Ceux
qui sintéressaient aux attitudes de la jeunesse étudiante envers les initiatives du
Front de libération du Québec devaient se contenter de déclarations partisanes, de
suppositions ou de oui-dire. Éric Bédard a donc le mérite de porter un regard cri-
tique outillé dun corpus de sources éclairantes qui nous place sur un terrain analy-
tique plus solide.
Cette étude savère des plus intéressante car lauteur a défini le milieu universi-
taire au sens large. Cest ainsi quil se penche sur les attitudes des étudiants universi-
taires montréalais francophones et anglophones et quil décrit les réactions des
professeurs et des administrateurs dans chaque institution universitaire à Montréal y
